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disC/osure Interviews Ida Susser 
virgins. The whole story cannot be told with ABC. It papers over the c.om-
plex human reality of the relationships between men and women m a 
gender-hierarchy world. It just doesn' t tell any story. It's a way of destroy-
ing the kinds of options that might otherwise be available, and bringing up 
images of sin, and of women who should have made one decision when 
they made another, when the real story is so different. Even putting it into 
terms of ABC is confusing and destructive, because it doesn't fit with what 
women are going through. Young girls aren't choosing to have sex. There's 
rape, and they're being married off at ten, eleven, and twelve, and they have 
no access to information or condoms. ABC is a farce; it's a misrepresentation. 
dC: After your talk, the question came up about the inequalities of risk in 
the United States. There are certain groups, especially African American 
women, who are at a higher risk of HIV infection. How does public knowl-
edge of this deepen the risk of stigmatization, thus exacerbating the in-
equalities and further marginalizing them? Does it? 
IS: I think we have to have ways of talking about reality. I think that exam-
ples like ACT UP [AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power] point to how people 
need to be treated like adu lts. They have to be able to talk about it. Epide-
miological data has to be made available. People have to know the story. 
Then, if you have respect for people, and people stand up and demand re-
spect, if you provide the information, people themselves will stand up, like 
they did with AIDS, and demand treatment, demand dignity in health care. I 
think how the information is presented obviously is important. It's more 
important that the population themselves recognize it and own it, and fight 
it in their own dignified and respective ways. It's like black power move-
ments: you have to know inequality and recognize all of its sides. There's 
no point in pretending that inequality doesn't exist. In some countries-
even in Europe, where race is not counted, or in the U.S., where class isn't 
statistically added up--it doesn 't do those groups any good. I think it is 
extremely important. In South Africa, the data on AIDS was not that public, 
who had it and how it spread. I think it's extremely important that, in South 
Africa, statistically more Africans have AIDS than the white population, 
and that it's stigmatizing is one of the things that Mbeki is willing lo talk 
about. But I feel that knowledge is important, numbers are important. But 
how you use those numbers and present those numbers is also important. 
There has to be some context. Numbers are part of the political battle, al-
ways. Certainly you don ' t want to keep the numbers quiet. So that 's what I 
think. 
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Creative Transcendence 
As the eccentric genius in Suicide in B-Flat, Niles tries to 
create a form of "visual music" that parallels Shepard's 
own pursuit of a polysensory theatrical form. Obsessed 
with liberating himself from the other, Niles seeks a 
purely aesthetic realm closed off from community and .its 
intrusive voices. In the end, however, he has no choice 
but to reconcile himself with communal consciousness, 
partly because the other also inheres in the mind ?f the 
artist. Similarly, in The Tooth of Crime, Hoss, the king of 
rock music, finds his aesthetic realm under attack by an 
arrogant young rival, Crow. ln their ultimate showdown, 
their weapon of choice is not guns or music but language. 
Like all artists, Niles and Hoss produce through creative 
transcendence, but they find that communicating with an 
audience also involves a dialogic relation between artist, 
art expression, and community. This dialogic re.lation, 
moreover, depends on the intimacy between the artist and 
his or her most inward self. As Michael Goldman notes, 
"intimacy comes from the Latin superlative intimus, 'most 
inward,' and the impulse, the desire, perhaps the need to 
achieve a superlative degree of inwardness, has haunted 
European thought since who-knows-when" (2000, 77). As 
argued here, the degree of intimacy between self and 
other depends on the degree of intimacy with ~ne's own 
self which consists of two aspects: self as socially con-
stru~ted identity, and self as one's "superlative degree of 
inwardness." ln the two plays discussed here, Shepard 
was influenced by develop1nents in American popular 
culture during the 1950s and '60s and wanted to create 
what he called "total" theater, or theater "where every-
thing is present at once" (Gilman 1984, xvi}-a process, 
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as we shall see, that points toward an intimacy with theself as transcenden-
tal reality. Although credited with bringing a postmodern aesthetic to the 
American stage, Shepard, as I will argue, does not undermine transcenden-
tal awareness but rather contextualizes it within American culture through 
theater that attempts to create a new intimacy with consciousness itself. 
Through an aesthetic symbiosis, Shepard's plays suggest a link be-
tween the social identity and transpersonal consciousness of the artist that 
forms the basis for intimacy. The intersubjective encounter between artist 
and audience, moreover, dramatizes mythic encounters with sacred experi-
en.ce. Antonin Artaud claims that, in Western theater, " the Word is every-
thing, and there is no possibility of expression without it" (1958, 68). Asian 
theater, on the other hand, has "its own language" identified with the mise 
en scene, one constituted by "the visual and plastic materialization of 
speech" and by everything "signified on stage independently of speech" 
(68-69). The materialization of speech serves to restore and reinstate the 
metaphysical aspect of theater, "to reconcile it with the universe" (70) and 
"to rediscover the idea of the sacred" (Artaud 1988, 276). These sacred 
elements are not restricted to Asian theater but can also be found in Western 
theater. Shepard's plays rely on ordinary language and the Word but also 
produce some of the effects Artaud describes in Asian theater: taking the 
spectator (and performer) toward greater intimacy with the source and goal 
o~ a~-namely, a transverbal, transpersonal experience paradoxically set 
w1~lll~ a cultural context. Theater does this by creating what Artaud calls "a 
v01d ~n thought" (1958, 71), a state of mind that begins with language and 
meanmg and then goes beyond them through a shift in consciousness as 
suggested by the creative enterprises of Niles and Hoss. ' 
. Shep.ard's theater achieves this in part through a process of transforma-
tions, an. idea ~o~o~ed from Open Theater and expanded upon in plays like 
Ange~ City, Su1c1de m B-Flat, and The Tooth of Crime. As Richards Gilman 
ex~lams, a transformation exercise involves "an improvised scene ... in 
which after a while, and suddenly, the characters were asked to switch im-
medi~tely to .a new scene and therefore to wholly new characters. Among 
~he aims (~h1ch were .never .wh~lly clear) were increased flexibility, insight 
mto theat.~1cal or actmg cltc~es and more unified ensemble of playing" 
(198~, ~;11). Such transformattons, as I suggest, also involve the "decontin-
genc~ng ?factor a.nd spectator from the boundaries of ordinary language 
and identity, allowmg for a greater intimacy with no-mind or a void in 
thought-which is one reason these transformations may seem "never 
wholly cle~r" in terms of logical discourse. Intimacy with our superlative 
degree of mwardness arguably forms the basis for all other forms of inti-
macy. It involves going beyond the duality of one's socially constructed 
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identity, beyond the intentional knowledge of the other distanced by a sub-
ject/object dualism, toward what Robert Forman calls "knowledge-by-
identity" (1999, 109). 
William James classified two kinds of knowledge or intentional experi-
ence, with the notion of intention entailing a subject's being aware of an 
object: "knowledge-about," which we gain by thinking about something, 
and "knowledge-by-acquaintance," which we gain through direct sensory 
experience (Barnard 1994, 123- 34; Forman 1999, 109- 27). Intimacy on 
these levels, however, always contains a spatial/temporal gap that prevents 
it from being superlative or complete. Forman refers to the "pure con-
sciousness event" as a nonintentional experience or "knowledge-by-
identity," in which there is no such gap or subject/object duality; "the sub-
ject knows something by virtue of being it. . .. It is a reflexive or self-
referential form of knowing. I know my consciousness and I know that I am 
and have been conscious simply because I am it" (118; italics in original). 
As a truly intimate or immediate form of knowledge, nonintentional experi-
ence is thus devoid of the dualism of the subject-perceiving-object and 
subject-thinking-thought (125). Through intimacy with the superlative di-
mension of the self, moreover, the spectator intuits the difference between 
intentional consciousness, through which we identify with our roles and 
egos, and nonintentional consciousness, through which the self beyond 
qualities reflexively knows itself through "knowledge-by-identity." Tills 
nonintcntional experience encompasses those defined by Western drama 
theorists as liminal, sublime, metaphysical, lransluminating, holy, and tran-
scendent, all of which are linked to the void in thought beyond the duality 
of subject and object, knower and known. Niles and Hoss, like the rest of 
us, have access to this level of knowledge only through a superlative degree 
of inwardness, induced in Shepard's theater through paradox and other 
devices that defamiliarize by attenuating the boundaries of thought. 
The Primal Holon 
Shepard's creative impulse or aesthetic vision of a total theater can be un-
derstood through the expressivist theory of the part/whole relationship in 
what Ken Wilber calls a "primal artistic holon" (1997, 114-16). Holan is a 
term coined by Arthur Koestler (1967) lo describe an entity that is itself a 
whole but simultaneously part of a larger whole, in an infinite series, such 
that each entity is neither whole nor part, but a whole/part, or holon. In 
Suicide in B-Flat and The Tooth of Crime, Niles's and Hoss's creative im-
pulses originate from a primal artistic holon, which bubbles up from the 
source of thought or the inner self. This source corresponds to transcenden-
thresholds 73 
Haney 
tal c~nsciousness (turiya) or the transpersonal self (atman) in Shankara's 
Ad~~1t~ (nondual) V.eda~t~ (Chakrabarti 1971, 33; Deutsch 1973, 48- 65), 
the v01d of conceptions m the Maitri Upanishad (Maitri 6: 18- 19; Hume 
192~, 436), and ~taud's void in thought. When manifested through aes-
thetic form, the pnmal holon enters the artist's conscious mind but not in a 
vacuum. Rather, it instantly engages the multiple contexts of 'human exis-
tence: the unconscious structures of the mind; our social roles, or who we 
seem to be; the structures of culture; and the global currents of the world 
about .which we may not even be consciously aware. ParadoxicaJJy, as de-
fined m .non?ual Vedanta, the transcendent primal whole, pure conscious-
ness, . bemg unmanent within as ~ell as transcendent, subsumes and, by 
entenng, becomes part of the tangible holons of artists' expressions within 
their cultural contexts. 
. Thr~ughout Sui~ide. in ~-Flat, Niles resists the intimacy of this holonic 
fus10n with commu~1ty m his att.empt to achieve intimacy with the transper-
son.al self or the v01d .of conceptions at the basis of aesthetic contemplation. 
Ultun~tel~, thou~h, h1s success as an artist compels him to accept the reality 
of social mtegratton because intimacy with his primal artistic holon extends 
outward naturally to include creative expression and community. The inti-
macy between self and other, like that with one's socially constructed self 
~orms part of a larger whole constituted by the intimacy of the primal artis~ 
he holon, or the transpe.rsonal self. Niles's encounter with this primal inti-
macy extends beyond his constructed identity to encompass the other on a 
~anspersonal level. Hoss, on the other hand, has lost confidence in his abil-
ity. to tap int? his primal holon and becomes obsessed with the glamour of 
bemg an artist as defined merely by social conventions. As a result his 
~xper~ence of in!imacy remains fractured by the spatial/temporal ga~ of 
mtenhonal consc10usness. 
As .an .unidentifia~le emptiness, the primal holon as pure consciousness 
or a v01d m ~ought is knowable, at least initially, not indirectly through 
~an~age or ideas, b~t. only through the immediacy (or knowledge-by-
1denttty) of .transcogmtJve, noncontingent being after language and ideas 
~ave run their course. Th.is ~ost intimate form of knowledge beyond duality 
mvolves t~e s:If's knowmg itself as a void of conceptions. Whatever third-
person,. ob1ecttve theory we use to describe it, the subjective "experience'' 
of a v?1d of conceptions is transc~ltura l, transpersonal, and thus largely the 
s.ame m any theater, whether Asian or American. Although functionalists 
hke Stev~n Katz (19?8) and Daniel Dennett (1991) question the likelihood 
~f unmed1ate~ expen:nce, claiming that different types of mystical, Gnos-
tic, or aesthetic expenence do not point to a shareable transcendent source 
but merely reflect different cultural traditions, Shepard's work illustrates 
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that, while all contentful experiences are context related, it is not inconsis-
tent to assume that contentless Gnostic or aesthetic experiences, although 
arising out of appropriate contexts, are nevertheless in and of themselves 
context free (see Almond 1990, 216). Differences in the expression of aes-
thetic experience, as Shepard uniquely demonstrates, reside only in the 
cultural contexts through which lranspersonal, mythic encounters with su-
perlative inwardness are evoked. 
Dorrine Kondo ( 1990) and other postmodernists argue against the un-
mediated experience of the self as pure consciousness and purportedly de-
mystify the so-called concept of self. As Shepard demonstrates, the decon-
struction of a concept as part of a cultural context does not extend to 
knowledge defined as contentless experience, for the self in its context-free 
status is not a concept. To conflate self and concept (or thought) of self 
would imply that a concept is able to engage in thought and simultaneously 
be aware of itself in the act of thinking, a claim that holds only if we accept 
the postslructuralist definition of the subject as a cultural construct dis-
persed along a chain of signifiers (Lacan 1978) and subjugated by relations 
of race, gender, and power. It would also apply to the generally accepted 
definition of the posthuman self (Pepperell 2003; Hayles 1999). It becomes 
invalid, however, from an Advaitan perspective that includes the considera-
tion of nonintentional pure consciousness, which, as a void of conceptions, 
is the source of concepts as well as the cultural paradigms that artists seek 
to amend through the primal artistic holon. In the basic ontological opposi-
tion between mincVbody on the one hand and consciousness on the other 
(Samkhya Yoga; Pflueger 1998), the latter as the internal observer comple-
ments the former, which, as a "concept of self," is a rhetorical construct 
based on the "Word as everything" typically associated with Western thea-
ter (Artaud 1958, 68). 
Shepard questions the unified concept of self as a function of the mind 
and, in the process, opens up a theatrical space in which performers and 
spectators share an intimacy with the self as a function of consciousness 
without qualities (turiya) (see Deutsch 1973, 62- 65). That we can know the 
internal observer only by being it and not by observing it (Deik.man 1996, 
355) precludes the possibility of infinite regress through which the self-
reflexive subject becomes the object of another subject in an endless chain 
of subject/object duality. Jean-Paul Sartre, moreover, although without 
referring to samadhi or higher stales of consciousness, says that, along with 
the awareness of objects in any intentional perception, there is a "non-
positional consciousness of consciousness itself' (1956, lv). This reflexive 
"non-positional consciousness," which is nonintentional, Sartre refers to as 
consciousness pour-soi (for itself), while the object of consciousness is en-
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soi (in itself): "For if my consciousness were not consciousness of being 
consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of the table with-
out consciousness of being so. In other words, it would be a consciousness 
ignorant of itself, an unconscious-which is absurd" (liv). For Sartre, "non-
positional self consciousness" is beyond perception in that it is not itself an 
object of intentional knowledge knowable by the thinking mind, although it 
nevertheless ties perceptions together. Sartre makes the argument against 
infinite regress for "non-positional consciousness" through reductio ad 
absurdum. 
This theory is comparable to the notion of defamiliarization in Russian 
formalism and to the alienation effect in Bertolt Brecht, which Tony Ben-
nett describes as a way "to dislocate our habitual perception of the real 
world so as to make it the object of renewed attentiveness" (1979, 20). 
Significantly, as drama theorists from Diderot to Stanislavsky and Brecht 
have argued, the performer who holds an aesthetic distance between actor 
and performance is more convincing in conveying the desired emotion to 
the audience. The Brechtian practice of baring theatrical devices by present-
ing a diversity of visual frames has the effect of exposing mono logical per-
spectives as nothing more than competing ideologies (Brecht 1964). As 
Shepard demonstrates, what Brechtian theater attempts to achieve, with its 
narrative discontinuity, refusal of realism; and alienation effect (A-effect), 
ultimately is not a distinction between one imaginary unity of mind and 
another, but rather a distinction between mind and consciousness, knower 
and known. This distinction emerges when the Brechtian gestus-"a ges-
ture, a word, an action" that exposes "the social attitudes encoded in the 
play-text" (Diamond 1988, 89)-succeeds in evoking the semiotically in-
visible; that is, when it directs attention from a self-dramatization to a self-
shedding, thereby opening awareness to the coexistence of the silence and 
dy.namism, boundaries and unboundedness characteristic of higher con-
s~10usness: Moreover, as Daniel Meyer-Dinkgrafe (2003) shows, immate-
nal consciousness cannot be thought about by the material intellect. As 
Niles and Hoss demonstrate, immaterial pure consciousness as expressed 
~hrough .the primal artistic holon exceeds the material mind, just as the actor 
m ~ntenng a dramatic text exceeds the text by rendering intimate for the 
audience the presence of a new life that the text does not exhaust (see 
Goldman 2000, 50). 
Suicide in B-Flat 
Holy Theater 
In Suicide in B-F/at, a mystery play about a jazzman gone missing, Shepard 
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dramatizes the manifestation of the invisible identity of an avant-garde 
artist. Peter Brook says of holy theater: 
All religions assert that the invisible is visible all the time . .. [but] 
it can only be seen given certain conditions . . . . To comprehend 
the visibility of the invisible is a life's work. Holy art is an aid to 
this, and so we arrive at a defmition of holy theater. A holy theater 
not only presents the invisible but also offers conditions that make 
its perception possible. (1968, 56) 
As in holy theater, the conditions of Suicide in B-Flat that render the invisi-
ble visible center on Nile's ontological crisis, his attempt to express in the 
pure form of jazz the silent or invisible dimension of music, which is tran-
scendent to as well as immanent within jazz. Pushing against the familiar 
world, the play expands the awareness of character and spectator by voiding 
its content and thus allowing them to share a superlative degree of inward-
ness. As critics have pointed out (Roudane 2002; Wade 1996), Shepard 
often uses baffling and illogical dramatic content, the effect of which is the 
decontingencing of conventional awareness. The artist's hallucinatory states, 
the arbitrary character turns, the feverish monologues, the mass-cultural 
allusions, and the surrealistic antics of the play all contribute to a narrative 
line that moves back and forth between visible and invisible reality. 
As the play opens, Louis and Pablo, two ineffectual detectives, investi-
gate Niles 's recent murder/suicide/disappearance. They conduct an eccen-
tric investigation, with Louis theorizing and Pablo eventually agreeing that 
Niles seems not to have been murdered but rather lo have orchestrated his 
own disappearance. But whether he was abducted or murdered or simply 
disappeared, Niles presents an enigma for the detectives, who in their con-
ventional mindset cannot fathom a musician's unconventional sensibilities. 
Their investigation takes them to Niles's home, where they meet several 
musicians, whom they question about his disappearance. As the plot un-
folds, Niles enters with his friend Paulette and is bothered by the outline of 
his body traced on the floor. Unseen by the other characters, Niles puts on 
various costumes, including a child 's cowboy outfit, representing the con-
ventional voices blocking his creativity by preventing access to his primal 
artistic holon. Although Niles worries about killing off the right voices, 
Paulette shoots these costumed figures in a symbolic attempt to exorcise the 
ghosts of convention that haunt him. The bullets and arrows she fires comi-
cally hit Louis and Pablo. Toward the end of U1e play, Petrone offers to take 
Niles ho1ne to confront U1e others and "clean the slate" (Shepard 1976, 
153). Niles finally meets the detectives, but, unlike artists, they lack the 
desire for intimacy with the more abstract levels of hwnan identity that 
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would connect them with a wider humanity (for further criticism of the 
play, see Mottram 1984; Hart 1987; Kleb 1989; McGhee 1993; Wilcox 
1993; and Bottoms 1998). 
In the play's epistemological context, the allusions lo Dick Tracy and 
Raymond Chandler suggest that the range of detective work extends from 
popular culture and .the whodunit motif to an investigation of something that 
s~ass~s computallon and the conceptual mind. Louis and Pablo sel up a 
dtshnchon between themselves as public servants and Niles and his friends 
as ~ists, or between the outer and inner, the visible and invisible domains, 
which are not so much oppositional as complementary, the latter transcen-
dent to but immanent within the former. 
While Louis and ~ablo conduct their investigation of Niles's apartmenl 
as the seen~ of the cnme, Petrone comes in looking for Niles, blowing si-
lently on his sax. In the ensuing conversation, Petrone refers to the Indian 
caste system ~nd twice con:plai~s of being a "Low Dog" (Shepard 1976, 
128, 131) .. This lo~ regard imphes that the artisl often registers as an un-
t~uchable m Amencan society, the apex of consumer capitalism. In the 
h.1erarchy of ~erican values, the invisible as represented by Petrone's 
silent horn playing not only falls below the visible threshold of the material 
~orld but is misconstrued by the very detectives who are bent on revealing 
its ~ec~~ts .. Goldman comments on this non-affinity for human intimacy: 
Whtie fictional representations of intimate contact have become more and 
more detailed and explicit, not only in sexual matters but in the increasingly 
~uance? portrayal .of consciousness and speech, the exchanges reported are 
mcre~s1.ngly u~sahs~aclory .... Certainly, from the point of view of drama 
the cns1s of pnvacy is best und~rstood as a crisis of intimacy" (2000, 79). 
Th~ c?nceplual, as symboltzed by Pablo's master's degree, cannot ren-
der the mh?1acy of a void in thought, as symbolized by silent music, except 
by way of.its own transcendence. The "immaterial cannol be thought aboul" 
(M~yer-Dmkgrafe 2003, 11), whether by fully or "half-baked intellectual 
notions" (Shepard 1976, 138). With his own crackpot ideas about artists 
Pablo a~~es that ~il~~' being po~sessed by his own gift, turned to "religion: 
Super~hhon, Cultism to have his demons tamed, with the result thal his 
melodies ~ave becoi:ne boring (129), a theory that Petrone rightly rejects. As 
a conventional pubhc servant, Pablo naively reverses Niles's true situation: 
namely, that of an arlis~ tryi~g to exorcise not his own gift but rather the 
demons that, as other vo.1ces, mter~ere with and obstrucl this gift. 
La~reen, .a~other fnend of Niles, wheels in a double acoustic bass fid-
dle ~bile em1ttmg a high-pitched scream. Playing the bass and talking to 
Lo~1s and Pablo, she says, "This music has no room for politics" (133) an 
attitude that reflects Niles's attempt to separate art and commu~ity. 
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Throughout this scene, Louis struggles on the floor against killing himself 
with a knife, as if possessed by a demon. Louis's demon, however, is not 
the kind that Pablo describes as possessing Niles, but rather the kind that 
Niles, with Paulette's help, has been trying to exorcise by orchestrating the 
death of all the voices that belong to other people, including people like 
Louis and Pablo. As a Republican, Louis represents the political, concep-
tual, role-playing end of the identity spectrum, the culturally constructed 
aspect of the self like his partner Pablo, while the artists, especially Niles, 
who embodies the primal artistic holon, represent the self as a void of con-
ceptions. At this point in the play, Niles and Paulette appear on stage under 
the spotlight, with the action alternating between them and the other charac-
ters. This alternation juxtaposes our role-playing identities in the visible 
world with the attempt lo reach the invisible dimensions of the self. As 
explained below in the context of the levels of language and consciousness 
suggested in The Tooth of Crime, nonintentional consciousness or the wit-
nessing self, as the groundless ground of the primal artistic holon, shares an 
intimate relationship with music as a unity of sound and form. 
Other Voices 
Although Niles has accepted Paulette's help lo prevail over other voices 
obstructing his way lo the invisible better self, he has qualms about her 
ruthless approach. Paulette justifies her method, however, arguing that the 
first victim, whose "whole face was blown off," was a mistake (Shepard 
1976, 141), and that Niles wanted to find a way out anyway. The gruesome 
fate of the first victim not only helps to hide what happened to Niles from 
the detectives, who double as agents of social conformity, but also suggests 
that the roles of our socially constructed selves, our masks, do not represent 
our true identity. On the contrary, identifying with the face as mask not only 
conceals but also precludes intimacy with the invisible nature of the inner 
self underlying all social constructions, whether conventional or unconven-
tional, avant-garde artist or public servant. Louis, who resists the loss of his 
constructed identity and its familiar contexts, says, "We've gotten ourselves 
into deep waler here! Can't you feel it? Everything's crazy! I've got to get 
my bearings back. It feels like we're involved in something we'd be better 
off not knowing about. I never wanted to kill myself before" (138). Figura-
tively, killing himself implies an unconscious attempt to escape the satu-
rated self (Gergen 1991) and move beyond conventional bearings toward 
the openness of nonintentional consciousness. In contrast to the detectives, 
Niles invites self-transformation and the wholeness of the self beyond quali-
ties: "All these ones have to go because they're crowding me up. They've 
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gotten out of control. They've taken me over and there's no room left for 
me. They've stolen their way into my house when I wasn't looking" 
(Shepard 1976, 141). The other voices, including those of Pablo and Louis 
searching his house, have invaded his inner space, blocking access to his 
core identity as pure awareness. 
Although Shepard sets up the condition for Niles's liberation the bid 
for freedom is not without ambivalence. Niles has become auach~d to the 
other voices, the musicians he learned from and invited into his house, and 
now says, "I don't want to be lonely" (142). Patrick Hogan argues that the 
"absolute isolation of consciousness" leads to a sense of "unbearable soli-
tude" (2~04,. 119), but this would apply only to ordinary waking conscious-
?ess, .wh1ch mvolves t~e duality of subject and object, not to knowledge-by-
ide~hty of pure consc10usness or the primal holon- the nonduality at the 
basis of all forms of intimacy. As Paulette says, the other voices block 
N~les's intimacy with his own creative intelligence: "You can't get to any-
~~~g new. It's always t~e same. :ou're repeating yourself." Niles agrees: 
It s not even myself I m repeatmg. I'm repeating them. Over and over. 
They talk to me all the time. (Suddenly screaming) Tl IERE'S VOICES COMING 
AT ME!" (Shepard 1976, 142). By donning a variety of costumes like the 
c~wboy outfit of Pecos Bill, King of Cowboys (whom Paulette ~ill shoot 
with a~ arrow t~at hits Louis in the back), Niles undergoes the kind of trans-
formation used m total theater. He switches suddenly from one character to 
an?ther, .with the hybridity of his social identity connoting an experience of 
bemg neither one nor the other, but an internal observer that witnesses both. 
Dressed as Pecos Bill, Niles worries whether it's even possible to kill a 
legend. In saying, "You can't kill a myth!" (143), he recognizes the diffi-
cu~ty. faced by an artis~ i? going. beyond conceptual content to the primal 
artistic holon. Pecos Bill s mythical hold on Niles makes him ambivalent 
and u~certain whether he wants to live or die. Paradoxically, the two go 
han.d m hand, for death ~f ~he old self comforted by familiar voices implies 
~ebirth of the nonpluralistJc self as internal observer. Niles's anxiety of 
mfluence compels him finally to accept thanatos, the death of the familiar in 
exchange for a new, inchoate. potentiality associated with aesthetic experi-
~nce. Later, Paulette shoots Niles dressed in a new guise of black tails. This 
time t~e b~llet finds Pa~lo, who, like Louis, represents the grand narrative 
of logical discourse and isolated constructed identity that Niles hopes to shed. 
In th~ ~nal scene, Petrone escorts Niles to his home to confront the 
others. Fmdmg Pablo on the floor, Niles accuses him of groveling but 
Pablo says, "I was on the verge of prayer" (154). Louis on the other hand 
says he lacks faith, claiming to "subscribe to no system' of thought. I'm 0~ 
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the verge of total madness" (154). Niles questions this statement: "The 
verge. Only the verge?" insisting there is no point in madness. Ironically, 
however, modem science has confirmed a long-suspected link between 
madness and creativity. As Neus Barrantes-Vidal says, "Substantial empiri-
cal work has shown that both creativity and the temperamental roots of 
psychoses have common features at a biological (e.g., high levels of dopa-
mine), cognitive (e.g., a brain organization characterized by a weak inhibi-
tory control that enables loosened or more flexible styles of mental activ-
ity), and emotional level (e.g., high openness to experience and phases of 
elation and intense enthusiasm)" (2004, 74-75). Like madness, creativity 
has its own neurophysiological condition, which corresponds to the "hy-
poaroused mystical states" that Forman describes as "marked by low levels 
of cognitive and physiological activity" (1999, 4). The ultimate hy-
poaroused state, according to Vedanta, is the pure consciousness event, as 
represented in Shepard's play through the primal artistic holon, which is 
also a means to the ultimate state of intimacy. Shepard's play suggests, 
therefore, that going off the deep end, while resembling madness, does not 
have to signify going mad per se; it can also denote the process of going 
beyond the duality of conscious content and its corresponding cultural con-
texts toward the unity of higher states of awareness with their own corre-
sponding physiological conditions. 
Although an artist would be more inclined to experience this process 
than the average person, anybody can (particularly a theater audience), as 
suggested by the fact that Niles is not the only one who appears to be mad. 
Pablo and Louis also behave insanely when on the verge of voiding thought, 
a process Niles describes in his final monologue: 
Are you inside me or outside me? Am I inside you? Am I inside 
you right now? ... Or am I just like you? Exactly like you? So ex-
actly like you that we're exactly the same. So exactly that we're 
not even apart. Nol even separate. Not even two things but just 
one. Only one. Indivisible. (Shepard 1976, 155) 
From a postexpcriential perspective, Niles is describing the contentless 
primal artistic holon, or what Yohanan Grinshpon would call the artist's 
better self or "Vedic otherness" (2003, 4); it is a boundaryless state of non-
intentional awareness inherent within yet beyond all thought and creative 
expression. Leslie Wade (1996) notes that this passage more than any other 
in Shepard expresses the dialogic relation between artist, art expression, and 
COffilnunity. It also suggests a fusion of the visible and invisible, mind and 
consciousness, artist and community. ln the end, Niles acceptS his social 
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responsibility by condemning murder: "Someone should pay for that," he 
says (Shepard 1976, 155), implying that cultural and primal holons are 
compatible as well as mutually interdependent. 
. With ~~icid~ in B-Flat, Shepard illustrates that aesthetic experience, 
l~e Gnos~ic~sm, mv~lves a movement of self-redemption induced by puri-
fymg one s mner bemg from the bondage of conscious content, including 
the fragmentary "concept of self' misconstrued as our essentialist identity. 
As H. J~nas writes, the spiritual being "does not belong to any objective 
scheme, is above the law, beyond good and evil, and a law unto himself in 
the power of his 'knowledge"' (1979, 334). The desire of an artist like 
Niles, to be elsewhere, to be different, in part reflects what Harold B loom 
calls the anxiety of influence, the drive to discover "what is oldest in one-
self' (1982, 12), which, being the most inward or intimate, would also be 
t?e most universal. As a function of the primal artistic holon, whether Gnos-
tic or aesthetic, this drive to "see earliest, as though no one had seen before 
~s" (69), is dramatized by Suicide in B-Flat but only suggested by its trace 
m The Tooth of Crime. 
The Tooth of Crime 
Rock Musicians 
The Tooth of Crime dramatizes an ostensible paradigm shift within rock 
c~lture .through the rivalry between two rock musicians. From an optimistic 
vie~om~, a younger, more vital generation supersedes an older one preoc-
cupied with the status quo. More pessimistica lly, the ruthless, mechanica l 
power of ego displaces a humaneness weakened by complacency and loss 
of self. Given the constraints of drama, the final contest between Hoss the 
~stablished ,~rti st, and Cro":, the brash contender, unfolds in a variet~ of 
languages, both real and mvented, through which each contestant vies to 
defme himself as the superior artist. The Referee, who sees the showdown 
as no contest, an~ounces Crow the winner because of his greater linguistic 
novelty and creative self-definition . Shooting the Referee in revenge Hoss 
resi~s himself to defeat and assumes the role of student of the y~unger 
man m the attempt to change his identity, at least on the surface. As the play 
suggests, however, any real development must originate from within and 
Hoss, having failed in this regard, gives up "to the big power ... ail the 
way" (Shepard 198 1, 249) and shoots himself in despair. 
Shepard traces the genesis and decline of an artist who begins as a rebel 
but loses courage and ends up "respectable and safe" (2 15). As the play 
su.ggests, Hoss's early success and recognition derive from his connection 
with the primal artistic holon but begin to slip away once he allows the 
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accoutrements of success to distract him from the source of inspiration 
wi thin. By succumbing to an obsession with turf wars and fame, he sets 
himself up as an easy target for an aspiring younger artist. 
In act 1, Hoss says, "Something's lacking. I can't seem to get it up like 
the other ki lls. My heart's not in it" (222). Ironically, Hoss is more con-
cerned with protecting his isolated persona than with keeping alive the 
unifying creative powers that helped construct this social identity in the firs t 
place. While claiming not to be worried about the "Gypsy" wanting to re-
place him, he nevertheless admits that he's intrigued: "His style is copping 
my patterns. I can feel it already and he' s not even here yet. He's got a 
presence" (222). This interest in the Gypsy and in preserving his own domi-
nance undermines his work and status as an artist. As Doc says, "You gotta 
stay disengaged, Hoss. The other way is fatal" (222). Significantly, Shepard 
reveals that the construction of social identity depends not only on the way 
others perceive us but also on the extent to which we stay in touch with the 
disengaged inner self, or nonintentional consciousness. For the artist, this 
represents the primal artistic holon, the translinguistic source of all artistic 
content manifested through contextual expressions. As The Tooth of Crime 
demonstrates, both artistic achievement and the constructedness of social 
identity are not purely social phenomena but are closely connected to the 
individual's ability to transcend the limits of rationalization and logical 
discourse. 
That Hoss loses touch with his own being gradually undermines his 
confidence in himself both as an artist and as a public figure. Hoss says, 
Ya know, you'd be O.K. , Becky, if you had a self. So would I. 
Something to fall back on in a moment of doubt, or terror or even 
surprise .. . . Look at the Doc. A slave. An educated slave. Look at 
me . . . . I feel so trapped. So fucking unsure. Everything's a mys-
tery. I had it all in the palm of my hand. The gold, the silver. I 
knew. I was sure. How could it slip away like that? (225) 
The self he refers to has two aspects, not only for himself as an artis t but 
also for Becky as a nonartist: the public, socially constructed self and the 
inner self as internal observer, the former a complex of conventional 
boundaries and the latter an infinite, holistic reservoir of creative intelli-
gence. Openness to this reservoir, as the play suggests, determines how 
good we feel about ourselves and the world around us. Any blockage to 
creativity resu lts in frustration, solipsism, and discontent, inevitably affect-
ing not only our emotions but also our behavior. Even subtle imbalances in 
our behavior determine how we are perceived by others, as illustrated by the 
consequences of Hoss's inability to disengage. Social identity reflects our 
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inner sense of self, which in tum depends on how intimate we are with the 
source of our own creative intelligence. For Shepard, this source is available 
to all, artist and nonartist alike. 
When Hoss exits momentarily at the beginning of act 2, Crow imitates 
his walk and sits in his chair, as if tasting victory in advance. When the 
contest begins, Hoss finds Crow's aggressive ingenuity with language dis-
concerting. As Crow spins out new, staccato rhythms, Hoss reverts to the 
established languages of older styles- western cowboy, 1920s gangster, 
voodoo-and is then surprised when Crow uses ordinary English: "There! 
Why'd you slip just then? Why'd you suddenly talk like a person? You' re 
into a wider scope than I thought" (230). As the play suggests, Crow's agil-
ity at switching back and forth between everyday language and creative 
expressions derives from his connection with the primal artistic holon, a 
skill Hoss has long since forfeited by selling out for riches and fame. Hoss 
intuits this loss when he says, "This is really weird, me learn in ' from you. I 
mean I can't believe myself admitting it" (229). After their initial encounter, 
Hoss exits and Crow sings his "Crow's Song," with the refrain, "But I be-
lieve in my mask- The man I made up is me I And I believe in my dance-
And my destiny" (232- 33). Although referring to his mask, Crow succeeds 
in projecting a winning social identity because of his greater intimacy with 
and ability to invoke the creative power of his inner being, as illustrated by 
his figurative language, originality, cognitive power, and exuberance of 
diction. In the middle of round one, Hoss, feeling outgunned by Crow's 
verbal ingenuity and confused by bis violation of verisimilitude, complains, 
"You can't do that!" (236). 
Crow's language takes liberty with reference, creating its own imagi-
nary context that belies Hoss's past. "He [Crow] was pickin' at a past that 
ain't even there. Fantasy marks. Like a dog scratchin' on ice. I can play that 
way if I was a liar. The reason I brought you [the Referee] into this match 
was to keep everything above the table. How can you give points to a liar?" 
(237). Although at one time he was perhaps equally innovative in achieving 
his own status as near-mythic hero, Hoss now clings to what he considers 
traditional realism, while Crow emerges as the radical innovator who shifts 
the ground in the repetitive cycle of modernist change. But, like Shepard, 
Crow is not a deconstructive postmodernist. Rather than undermining tran-
scendence, the battle between the rival musicians reveals that the language 
of the more creative artist has a disturbingly defamiliarizing effect on his 
opponent because of its closer affinity with transcendence or presence. 
Derrida, as we know, deconstructively argues with regard to the trace that 
"the possibility of the reference to the other, and thus of radical alterity and 
heterogeneity, of difference," is always already inscribed "in the presence of 
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the present that it dis-joins" (1994, 75). While Crow's nonreferential style 
may resemble poststructuralist self-referral, however, it does not undermine 
transcendental awareness so much as recontextualize it within American 
culture. Hoss doesn't see it that way, of course, having lost his former apti-
tude for transcendence through the distraction of worldly success. 
Language and Presence 
For Derrida, transcendence refers only to the relation between inside and 
outside, with the outside being transcendent merely to the inside, rather than 
being independent of thoughts like nonintentional consciousness as the 
internal observer. From an Advaitan perspective, on the other hand, the 
other in its radical alterity always already encompasses two dimensions: 
duality and singularity, mind and consciousness, with the latter dimension 
both immanent within the former as well as transcendent. Crow and Hoss, 
therefore, while in some ways radically other on the outside, can be under-
stood as sharing a oneness on the inside, in terms of their social identity as 
artists and their affinity for aesthetic experience. Through the self-referral 
indeterminacy of his jiving wordplay, Crow invokes the transcendent unity 
of the primal artistic holon that Hoss possesses and, at one time, co~ld 
reach but has now enshrouded with the familiar duality of the matenal 
world that obstructs his view. This materialism bas the effect of directing 
Hoss's awareness outward through the five senses rather than inward to-
ward the unity of nonintentional consciousness. In the context of the play, 
Crow's figurative language, which attends more to the signifie~ tha? to the 
signified, as in ordinary, nonpoetic language, produces an ahenatmg and 
even mystical effect. 
Explaining literature using the terms of cognitive science, Reuven Tsur 
argues that wit and mysticism, when used as artistic d~vices, p~o?uce.more 
than the merely conceptual effect of formulating mystic or religious. ideas; 
they also "somehow seem to reach the less rational layers of the .~d by 
some drastic interference with the smooth functioning of the cognitive sys-
tem, or by some quite smooth regression from 'ordinary consciousness' to 
some 'altered state of consciousness"' (2004, 60). Crow's songs and verbal 
dueling, while perhaps not as radical today as when the pl~y was fu:st per-
formed derive from and have the practical effect of movmg the mmd to-
ward a~ altered state of consciousness. They not ·Only display and evoke 
knowledge-about and knowledge-by-acquaintance but also provide a taste 
of knowledge-by-identity. Tsur claims that even "dead" ornaments, when 
revived tlu-ough poetic manipulation, can to various degrees create an ex-
perience of alienation (from the familiar world), ecstasy, and transcendence. 
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In the case of Crow, the effect depends on whether we consider Hoss from 
within the play or focus on today's audience, for whom his style of verbal 
play may now seem all too familiar. 
Shepard's notion of the influence of an artist, however, is supported by 
Tsur's study of the effects of mysticism and metaphysical poetry. The cog-
nitive scientist Steven Katz, moreover, explains how the shock of paradoxes 
can take the mind beyond rationalizations and logical certitudes toward a 
superlative degree of inwardness: 
Such linguistic ploys exist in many places throughout the world, 
usually connected with the conscious constn1ction of paradoxes 
whose necessary violations of the laws of logic are intended to 
shock, even shatter, the standard epistemic security of "disciples," 
thereby allowing them to move to new and higher forms of in-
sight/know ledge. That is, mystics in certain circumstances know 
that they are uttering nonsensical propositions, but in so doing they 
intend, among other things, to force the hearers of such proposi-
tions to consider who they are- to locate themselves vis-a-vis 
normal versus transcendental "reality." ( 1992, 7- 8) 
Crow's "jive rhythms" involve, at least for Hoss and for Shepard's original 
audience, the construction of paradoxes that attenuate the boundaries of 
thought. This form of transcendence takes the performer and audience be-
yond Derrida's inside/outside duality by suggesting the unity of a void of 
conceptions. Unable lo cope with Crow's nonrepresentational language, 
which forces one to abandon the ordinary levels of mind, Hoss feels con-
fused and insecure. 
Indian language theory, first expounded in the Vedas and developed by 
the fifth-century grammarian Bhartrhari, posits that ordinary waking and 
transcendental pure consciousness yield the experience of different levels of 
language. In ordinary waking consciousness, language appears as a tempo-
ral sequence and consists of two aspects: vaikhari (outward speech) and 
madhyama (inward speech or thought). In nonintentional pure conscious-
ness, on the other hand, the two higher levels of pashyanti and para extend 
beyond ordinary experience (Coward 1980, 126- 37). These higher levels, 
which are unavailable to the ordinary mind, consist of a unity of sound and 
meaning without temporal sequence; all phenomenal differentiations disap-
pear and meaning is apprehended as a noumenal whole. In ordinary waking 
consciousness, vaikhari and madhyama give only a partial expression of a 
unified meaning or "transcendental signified" available on the higher levels 
of language. As suggested in The Tooth of Crime, these higher levels, which 
transcend the spatializing/temporalizing movement of difference that de-
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pends on a space/time continuum, are analogous to Crow's musical sp~ech. 
This language involves a shift from a referential toward a nonreferentlal or 
transcendent reality, which has a defamiliarizing and disorientating effect 
on Hoss, now stagnated on the isolating ordinary level of langu~g~ and 
consciousness. As we have seen, Suicide in B-Flat also reveals the mtunate 
relationship between self and music. Niles's musical gift and Petrone's 
silent compositions on the sax suggest the invisible unity of sound and 
meaning- the noumenal whole underlying the temp~ral s~quence of phe-
nomenal differentiations. Indeed, as argued here, nonmtenhonal conscious-
ness as the primal artistic holon constitutes the unified source of poetry and 
music. 
Shepard's dramatic use of open, organic language and mu~ic was influ-
enced not only by European absurdists, such as Arta.ud and ~rran~ello, but 
also by American culture in the 1960s and '70s, a time of liberat~on fro~ 
normative values and academic formalism. As Matthew Roudane puts it, 
"Shepard learned from the free associative forms of Beat poetry. He . em-
braced the improvisational aspects of a free language, of a word-play liber-
ated from rigid structures of meter and logical coheren~e. The ~oetIJ:' of 
Lawrence Ferlinghetti and Allen Ginsberg appealed to his verbal unagma-
tion as did Jack Kerouac's 'oceanic' prose in On the Road (1957)" (2002, 
4). Suicide in B-Flat and The Tooth of Crime have their roots both in 
American Beat culture and more significant, in the transcultural freedom 
associated with the internal' observer. Like those of other artists, Shepard's 
improvisational forms arise out of his access to deeper levels . of language 
and consciousness. Not only U1e Beats but also many others m the 1960s 
and '70s participated in widening the gap be.t"':'~e~ st~aig~t and outlaw cul-
ture, particularly through the visionary poss1b1hlles mspued by the use of 
hallucinogenic drugs such as psilocybin, peyote, and LSD. Dr_ug use al.so 
precipitated a transitory experience of the inti~a~y ass.ociated w1~ ~he. uruty 
of pure consciousness as the source of creallve mtelhgence .. This mtunacy 
underlies the use of autobiographical forms and the exploration of altem~­
tive traditions such as Zen and Tantric Buddhism, Hinduism, and erotic 
mysticism. William S. Burroughs thought of the nan:ative as. a journey into 
a fantasy world where we discover the real. He considered his novel Na~ed 
Lunch (1959) to be a holy text, the embodiment of the Word through which 
the reader can achieve a sacred experience. . 
The Word as a manifestation of higher levels of language, unavailable 
in the temporality of ordinary waking consciou~ness ~d its d~ality of sub-
ject and object, is cognized through a process 1? which. meanmg and con-
sciousness begin to fuse, as in the case of aesthell~ expenence, suggested by 
Shepard's plays. In light of this distinction, Dernda and other poststructur-
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alists operating on the level of mind attempt to deconstruct the absolute 
truth value of that which turns out to be merely a relative manifestation of 
the abs~lute (vaikh~ri and madhyama) rather than the absolute itself (para). 
Accordmg to Advaita (nondual) Vedanta, because the latter is unavailable 
to the temporal mind alone, strictly speaking it can neither be deconstructed 
nor legitimated by it. This distinction makes it essential fo r artists, like Hoss 
and Crow, to keep open their connection with nonintentional consciousness 
the b~sis of a ~l intimacy. Otherwise, instead of achieving the status of ~ 
~ythic her? with whom all can identify, they wilJ merely lose their ground-
mg and ~omt o~ refer~nce. As Tsur says, "Orientation is the ability to locate 
oneself m one s en~ironrnent with reference to time, place, and people" 
(2004, 69). Crow's Jive shatters Hoss's "standard epistemic security," as if 
Crow were the master and Hoss the disciple brought face-to-face with the 
specter of his lost transcendental reali ty- the only point of reference that 
never changes and thus constitutes the source of all stability. After the third 
round of their duel, which the Referee calJs a TKO Hoss tries to redeem 
himself by imploring Crow, "You could teach me. r' could pick it up fast" 
(Shepard 1981, 241 ). 
. J:3ut the cost is high, the new master unscrupulous, and Hoss not only 
d1sonented on all levels of language and mind but also dispossessed when 
Crow takes everything as the victor's spoils: "O.K. This is what I want. All 
your turf from Phoenix to San Berdoo cJear up to Napa Valley and back. 
The ~hole shot. That's what I want" (242). Hoss fa ils to exploit his disori-
entation f?r the sake of greater knowledge/insight- the universal intimacy 
of the v01d of concepti?ns: "This isn' t the way it's supposed to happen. 
Why do you wanna be hke me anyway. Look at me. Everything was going 
good . ... Now I'm outa' control. . .. Nothin ' takes a solid form. Nothin ' 
sure an? fi~al. ~here do I stand! Where the fuck do I stand!" (243). Instead 
of reonentm~. hims.elf to transcendent reality through the primal artistic 
bolo~ b~ revivi~~ his music at its source. in the self as witness, Hoss yearns 
for his" normal worl? of stardom, which he tries to regain by imitating 
C~o~. Just help me mto the style. I'll develop my own image. I'm an 
ongmal .man. A one.and only. I just need some help" (241). As viewed from 
the outside, Hoss thmks of himself as an original man but the inner source 
of that orig.inality, the true basis for its preservation: has been overshad-
?~ed._ Feelmg trapped and defeated, Hoss tries to refashion himself by 
1~1tatmg Crow, who . asks, "Are you blank now?" (246). Going blank im-
phe.s not only emptymg out the contents of one's mind that sustain one's 
so~1ally constru~ted identity but also attaining pure consciousness as the 
v01d of conceptton.s. "':'hat Crow explicitly intends, however, is that Hoss 
merely blank out his failed social identity in the vain hope that he can more 
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readily assume the ruthless role of "A true Killer" (247) like Crow himself. 
Yet Hoss, having once tasted the true emptiness of nonintentional pure 
consciousness, soon realizes that Crow's manipulating tactics have led him 
down a soul-destroying path: "It ain' t me! IT AIN 'T ME!" (247). 
In a vain attempt to undermine Crow's self-confidence, Hoss attacks 
his image as an artist, calling him "pitiful," a description Crow rejects (248-
49). Ultimately, however, the play suggests that Crow's victory will be just 
as fleeting as Hess 's, given that his attention has switched from the primal 
artistic holon to the accoutrements of his worldly status he has tried to en-
hance by defeating Hoss. Crow might be a "master adapter," but adapting to 
the socially constructed identity of a preexisting situation cannot compete 
with the transformative powers of genuine innovation derived through the 
internal observer. Having reached what he perceives to be the end of the 
road, Hoss takes his own life, in effect suggesting a transcendence through 
death that he fa iled to sustain in life. Although Crow says that Hoss didn ' t 
"answer to no name but loser" (250), the subtext of the play indicts both 
artists for getting distracted from the internal observer as the core of crea-
tive intelJ igence, and society for allowing money to dictate our values and 
detach us from our true self-identity. 
What Shepard's theater makes visible is not just the material, one-
dimensional multiplicity of difference but the radical alterity of pure con-
sciousness on the intimate level of knowledge-by-identity. Niles and Hoss, 
like Derrida's trace and other aconceptual concepts, demonstrate that, while 
presence as the ultimate intimacy is inaccessible to the thinking mind, it can 
still be pointed to by way of suggestion, either through the theater's unsay-
able secret or through the power of figurative language to allow or make 
come a nonordinary level of language and consciousness- the essence of 
aesthetic experience available not only to artists and musicians but to ev-
erybody. David DeRose claims, "In the end, Shepard's writings suggest that 
the rock messiah is an unattainable ideal, the pursuit of which leads to self-
delusion or self-destn1ction" (2002, 230). What this implies is that no rock 
star or any other artist can become a mythic hero unless he or she keeps an 
open channel to the primal artistic holon. An artist does not attain the status 
of rock messiah deliberately, as in the case of a socially constructed iden-
tity, but only as an epiphenomenon of the experience of transcendental 
reality. While Hoss tries to preserve his social identity as an artist without 
regard for its founda tion in higher consciousness, Niles wants to divest 
himself of the conventional voices that block his access to pure conscious-
ness as the source of creativity. 
Through a symbiosis of the material and inunaterial, mind and con-
thresholds 89 
Haney 
scious~ess, self and community, Suicide in B-Flat and The Tooth of Crime 
dramatize the subtle presence/absence of a contentless realm of experience 
that underlies all intimacy and all forms of expression, whether social or 
artistic. In setting up the conditions that make perception of the invisible 
possible, these plays also reveal the risks of neglecting this possibility. 
Howeve~ defamiliarizing or disorienting the emergence of the invisible may 
seem, this process occurs spontaneously and even joyfully for anyone who 
cares to cultivate an intimate relationship with pure awareness. Because 
intimacy as defined in association with higher consciousness brings in-
volvem~nt a.long with nonattachment, it gives one the critical perspective of 
an outs.1der 1~ .the sense that one is in while simultaneously not of the con-
text. bemg cntlcal.ly observed. Paradoxically, this unbounded intimacy un-
derlies the Brechtian A-effect, the Sartrian nonpositional consciousness the 
primal a.rtistic holon, and all other forms of critical distance to conce~tual 
b?undanes, thereby allowing one to discover ever new truths previously 
hidden, and to create ever new human possibilities. 
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